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Shifting spaces of contention
An analysis of the Ultras’ mobilization in Revolutionary Egypt
Suzan Gibril
 
Introduction
1 The emergence of contentious collective action since the early 2000s1, and especially in
the aftermath of the 2011 popular uprisings has contributed to the transformation of
public  space  in Egypt,  revealing  a  wide  range  of  political  and  social  actors.  The
development of contentious actions, as well as the use of the street as a powerful political
tool encouraged the emergence of new spaces of protest, but also the development of new
strategies of opposition. During and after the events of 2011, Tahrir Square – and by
extension the “street”,  understood as the space allowing for the expression of public
opinion – became a symbol of unity, hope, and empowerment, all the while allowing new
actors to appear on the political and social scenes. The investment in public space has led
to an examination of the different ways of thinking, organizing and staging collective
action. Egyptian football supporters in particular, are known to make use of public space
within the framework of  their  activities,  by utilizing the stadium,  the walls  and the
“territory” surrounding the stadium and their meeting points.  Early in the uprisings,
they notably played a central role during the clashes with the security forces, helping to
“bring down the wall of fear”.2 Their experience in street fights, their turbulent spirit,
their frequent use of violence,3 their audio-visual tools (flags, songs, banners and graffiti),
as well as their practices of public space investment have contributed to the development
and redefinition of collective action in revolutionary and post-revolutionary Egypt.
2 Beyond the physical investment of Tahrir, it is interesting to look at the occupation of
other spaces by the Ultras groups, particularly their occupation of the different walls
surrounding  the  stadiums  and  Tahrir  Square.  This  article  aims  to  examine  the
mobilization of the Cairo Ultras groups by looking into their use of space, first within
stadium  grounds,  and  particularly  through  their  use  of  graffiti  art.  This  choice  is
essentially motivated by the fact that their main space of mobilization, the stadium, was
off-limits to them after the events of Port Said,4 which will be discussed below. Through
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an analysis primarily centred on their graffiti, we wish to account for the evolution in
their mobilization, as well as understand the development and transformation of their
messages. On the one hand, the article will focus on the use of physical space by the
Ultras and the messages conveyed within the stadium. On the other hand, it will address
the issue of the rapport with figures of authority, especially with the police force, and
discuss the assimilation of the concept of martyrdom by the Ultras groups, as well as its
evolution.
3 With regard to the structure of the paper, it will be divided into three main parts. The
first part aims at discussing the making of contentious collective action and theorizing
public space within the scope of collective action. How do we define public space and
street politics within authoritarian contexts? The second section focuses on the stadium
as the Ultras’ earliest space of mobilization. Particular attention will be paid to Port Said
and its significance in altering the Ultras groups’ utilization of space. The third part is
based on a thorough analysis of graffiti art as a means of occupying space and resistance.
We will  start  by  focusing on the  relationship between the  Ultras  and the  figures  of
authority with a special emphasis on the police. Finally, we will discuss the concept of
martyrdom and its use by the Ultras within the framework of their activities.
4 An examination of the Egyptian case,  and particularly the study of a bottom-up case
focusing on traditionally non-political groups (Bayat 2009: 22) such as the Ultras, opens
up new analytical perspectives for the study of contentious politics in the Middle East.
These daily dynamics of resistance are reshaping these societies in a way that is seldom
explored by Western scholars, and discredited by the holders of authoritarian power in
the region (Bayat 209: 23). By recognizing the power of local actors such as the Ultras, and
examining their activities, these “citizen (non)movements”5 highlight the new ways by
which ordinary individuals can limit state control,  and stimulate change within their
respective communities. Moreover, the sports arena and by extension the Ultras groups
can reveal certain social complexities and struggles, particularly in contexts where the
dominant power exerts pressure on its population.
5 Indeed,  regimes  such  as  the  Mubarak  regime  in  Egypt  are  characterized  by  weak
opportunities for the development of opposition movements and collective mobilization
(Bennan-Chraïbi and Filleule 2003; Benin and Vairel 2013; Allal; Cooper 2012), as well as
by the quasi-systematic repression of collective mobilization (Abdelrahman 2013). The
lack of political opportunities can therefore lead to the development of “new spaces of
contention”,  as  a “part  of  the social  world built  on at  the same time against  and in
reference to the political field and its formal institutions” (Beinin; Vairel 2013: 33). The
stadium and its surroundings, as well as the art of graffiti can be understood as one of
these spaces of freedom and autonomy where the frustrations of humiliation and abuse
could be channelled.
6 The majority of the data was gathered around Tahrir Square and Mohammed Mahmoud
Street, as well as around the Ahly and Zamalek stadiums during a series of field trips
conducted between 2012 and the beginning of 2015. Graffiti are of particular interest in
the Egyptian case, most notably because they allow for the expression of a specific social
and/or political reality using precise graphic and discursive rules. We also rely on a series
of interviews conducted between 2013 and 2015, with Ultras of the two main football
clubs in Cairo,  namely Ahly and Zamalek. The use of interviews has proven to be an
important tool and asset for making sense of political  phenomena, particularly when
discussing Port Said and the shift in mobilization observed among the Ultras groups.
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 Contentious collective action and the making of public
space
7 The Egyptian Revolution has impacted on the dynamics of political participation. Formal
political participation in Egypt was predominantly restricted to regime-affiliated party
activity,  co-opted  civil  society  participation,  and/or  voting  in  non-transparent  and
fraudulent elections (Khatib 2013: 315). This compelled the development of “underground
movements” and alternative spaces of freedom (Bromberger et al. 2002; Bayat 2009; Atef
2014). The stadium and the football arena as a whole became one of those spaces, allowing
for free expression of opinions and catalysing social tensions and frustrations, ultimately
becoming  a  space  of  political  socialization,  a  space  where  individuals  familiarized
themselves with politics and social issues.6 These spaces defied the coercive measures put
in place by the government – such as the law on political parties7 – to avoid any political
opposition and limit the influence of social movements and opposition forces (Khatib
2013: 322). 
8 The concept of space is often debated in the social science literature, showing how it has
shaped political mobilization as well as contentious politics (Moore 1998; Castells 2009;
Miller 2000; Martin; Miller 2003). Spatiality is to be understood as multiple and equally
significant, though certain spatialities might be of greater significance in the articulation
of a specific process (Miller 2013).  According to Miller,  space matters because it  is  a
“medium through  which  all  social  relations  are  made  or  broken  –  and  making  and
breaking relationships is at the core of collective action” (2013:286). Henri Lefebvre (1991:
62)  adds  that  underestimating,  ignoring  or  diminishing  “space  amounts  to  the
overestimation of texts, written matter, and writing systems, along with the readable and
the visible, to the point of assigning to these a monopoly on intelligibility”.
9 The  conceptualisation  of  space  in  dissident  contexts  has  benefitted  from a  growing
interest in the literature (Bayat 2003; Massey 2007; Rabbat 2011). However, these authors
often focus on the visibility that these spaces provide, the streets being a “theatre of
action and a place to use the power of collectives”8 rather than the impact it can have on
social  actors.  Indeed  already  in  2003,  Martin  and  Miller  (2003:  143)  expressed  their
concern regarding the minimisation of certain aspects “such as the construction of space
or the context that has led to the development of certain fundamental concepts such as
identity, political opportunities, demands and resources”. According to both authors, it
remains essential to think of space, not only as an instrument of collective action, but also
as a constituent element of it (2003: 144).
10 It  is  in  this  sense  that  Tilly  has  integrated  the  question  of  space  into  the  study  of
mobilizations by addressing the concepts of “safe spaces” or “control of spaces” as stakes
of contentious politics (Tilly 2000: 136, 149). Tilly states that these safe spaces are part of
the spaces where protesting politics can occur (Tilly 2000: 144). Due to their location, or
their legal status, some spaces are more likely to offer protection against repression by
the security forces.
11 Atef,  on  the  other  hand,  added  to  the  definition  of  public  space,  specifically  in
authoritarian contexts, by introducing the concept of “public policy space” as a place of
struggle between a powerful elite and a weakened population (2014: 69). The public space
then becomes a space for  citizens  to  “practice”  their  opposition to  the government,
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actively seeking to increase and challenge the limitations imposed by political  power
(2014: 55). Contentious protests are induced through street demonstrations and public
debates  organized  on  various  topics  relating  to  government  policy,  although  also
prompted by the mosques, universities (to a certain extent) and stadia, which, as we will
see, offer greater freedom of expression as they are able to break away from the control
networks set up by the regime and its security apparatus.
12 The  development  of  contentious  collective  action  in  authoritarian  contexts  is  most
commonly  complicated  by  the  regime’s  response  to  counter-powers:  strong  coercive
agencies who have carte blanche when it comes to defending state interests. These police
forces  usually  resolve  to  what  they  call  “routine”  forms  of  repression,  such  as
surveillance,  threats,  harassment,  detention  and  “legal  persecution”  (tax  authorities,
extortion) to restrict and discourage any kind of dissident behaviour. The Egyptian case –
at least until 2014 and the rise to power of general Abdel Fattah al-Sisi – is interesting in
this regard; firstly because it sheds light on the weaknesses of such authoritarian regimes
and secondly because it allows for a first-hand analysis of the development of large-scale
mobilization.  However,  when  contentious  collective  action  develops  in  authoritarian
contexts, a central question that emerges is that of the (in)stability and sustainability of
the democratic process. The political system in Egypt, since the abdication of King Farouk
in 1952, has been a succession of authoritarian rules. The large-scale popular uprisings of
2011 opened a whole range of possibilities, allowing different segments of society to come
together, express themselves and envisage their future for the first time in decades.
13 When studying collective action, it is valuable to characterize the form of mobilization
that  is  being observed in a  certain context.  To this  end,  James C.  Scott’s  concept  of
infrapolitics encompasses the wide variety of acts, gestures and thoughts that are not
quite political enough to be perceived as such (1999:183). In the case of collective action,
infrapolitics can refer to forms of mobilization that do not fit into the main classifications
of political action. That is to say it can also include certain forms of participation that
imply  a  degree  of  collectiveness  but  that  do  not  fall  into  the  category  of  social
movements. Originally, such politics was made up of a number of small actions, a day-to-
day politics that avoided dangerous risks; a politics for those living in autocratic settings,
for the peasantry and the poor. Though made up of thousands of small acts, this form of
infrapolitics  had the potential  to become an enormous aggregate consequence (Scott
2012:113). The concept has since been borrowed and expanded so as to include a wider
variety of acts of resistance and/or protest which, for the most part, do not enter the
classic realm of “politics” but whose messages or consequences are highly political. 
14 Indeed, certain infrapolitical forms of mobilization do not enter the category of “failed
movements” or “movements-to-be”, even though they perform a certain symbolic form
of critique and resistance (Marche 2012: 5). That is to say that certain acts of mobilization,
such as street art, cannot be analysed in the same way as lobbying actions, or political
campaigns or demonstrations organised by trade unions or established social movements.
Infrapolitical acts, such as the use of graffiti as a means of expression, operate beneath
the boundaries of political detectability, which makes them reliable vehicles of resistance.
Infrapolitical forms of resistance can thus be central in authoritarian contexts because
these “offstage discursive practices are continually pressing against the limit of what is
permitted onstage, much as a body of water might press against a dam” (Scott 1990:196).
Among these “alternate” channels of mobilization, one can list the use of street art, or the
use of the stadium – at least in the early days of the uprisings – as efficiently expressing a
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resentment towards the ruling regime, without these acts being considered alarming by
the regime authorities.
15 Infrapolitics  is  of  particular  interest  in  the  Egyptian case.  Because  the  population is
deprived of legitimate channels of expression, the different active groups do not express
their grievances in a conventional way, favouring other channels of mobilization aiming
at challenging the status quo and/or making a claim for dignity. This is the case of the
Ultras groups whose activities mostly centre on football and their club, however their
acts – especially during and in the aftermath of the uprisings – can be perceived as highly
political.  These groups share the common idea that  their  social  and political  reality,
whether linked to their activities as supporters or to the events unfolding (such as the
Egyptian uprisings or the events of Port Said), could be changed through mobilization.
Their mobilization takes on several forms, but mostly translates into the use of chants,
slogans and, more importantly, graffiti. The use of alternate tools of mobilization, and
unconventional  ways  of  expressing  opinions  and  grievances  raises  the  question  of
whether to address these forms of mobilization as politically explicit without their means
being qualified as “political”, or as practices which are not political either in terms of
content or means (Marche 2012: 4). 
16 What is more, one of the key components in the modern interpretation of infrapolitics is
the question of anonymity. When the social actor is able to conceal his identity, whether
by acting in the shadows or within an undistinctive mass, his voice, and message(s) can be
clearer and sharper (Scott 2012). In the Ultras’ case, the use of graffiti as a means of
protest  is  –  among  other  motives  linked  to  their  activities  as  a  group  –  essentially
motivated by the fact that it guarantees a space for the voicing of grievances, concerns,
opinions when most of the other channels of expression are blocked, as well as because it
preserves the individual’s identity while affirming his/her allegiance to a particular and
identifiable group. 
17 Scott’s infrapolitical model of resistance is useful to account for the different forms of
mobilization that  do not  enter  the  traditional  models  of  collective  action and social
movements, as well as to understand the Ultras’ mobilization within the framework of
their supporting activities. However, it is not sufficient to clarify and explain the multiple
dynamics  unravelling  within  these  different  groups outside  of  stadium grounds,  and
particularly as of the moment they left the stadium and reclaimed the street in the early
days of the Revolution. Accordingly, Asef Bayat’s concept of “street politics” is interesting
in this sense,  mainly because it  is concerned with everyday modes of resistance,  and
allows an examination of the “the dynamics of free-form activism, to describe the politics of
informal  people  and  the  dis-enfranchised”  (Bayat  1997,  55-56).  Certain  forms  of  “street
politics” allow for an examination of the way people resist beyond the usual channels of
contentious politics (marches, sit-ins, massive protests, etc.). This concept is particularly
suitable for addressing the Ultras’ mobilization during the uprisings and after the closure
of stadium grounds (following the events of Port Said),  as well  as their rapport with
figures  of  authority,  as  we will  see how these groups “carry  out  their  activities  not  as
conscious political acts”, but “[they] are driven by force of necessity — the necessity to survive
and live a dignified life” (Bayat 1997:57). 
18 The  element  of  space  in  contentious  politics  distinguishes  it  from  other  forms  of
resistance such as sit-ins or strikes, mainly because streets are not only where people
protest, but also where they extend their protest beyond their immediate circle (Bayat
2009:167). For this reason, one finds a wide range of actors including the “marginalized” –
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the unemployed and the poor9 – as well as other actors such as students, women, state
employees, artists, whose presence on the street is designed to enhance their struggle. It
is the wide spreading of protest that threatens authorities who make use of violence and
intimidation over these spaces – spatial division, police patrols, and anti-riot squadrons
(2009:167). This tactic of encircling and using intimidation and violence is frequently used
during  football  matches  against  the  Ultras,  mainly  to  supersede  the  potential  of
expansion to other people present in the stadium. By refusing to withdraw themselves
from social  and political  stages that were controlled by the regime authorities,  these
groups of social actors generated and discovered new spaces to voice their dissent. In
such settings, the street  becomes the ultimate arena to communicate discontent and
grievances (Bayat 2013:12). 
19 But more than just centred on conflict, streets are also spaces of flow and movement,
where identities are forged and solidarities enlarged (Bayat 2013:13). So space does not
simply serve as a stage for contentious collective action, it also shapes its patterns and
resolutions. In this context, the political street (also known as the “Arab Street”),10 denotes
the “collective sentiments,  shared feelings,  and public opinions of ordinary people in
[their daily] practices that are expressed broadly in public spaces – in taxis, buses and
shops,  on  street  sidewalks,  or  in  mass  street  demonstrations”  (Bayat  2013:14).  The
concept of political street and street politics will also be applied to other public spaces than
the physicality of the street and the midan, in the form of the walls and their use by street
artists. Indeed graffiti, much like the physical presence on the street, are efficient ways of
utilizing public space to convey a message and take possession of a given territory in an
act of protest. 
20 As we will see in the following sections of this paper, the Ultras were able to adapt their
mobilization processes and tools to overcome the stadium ban and police repression by
reclaiming other spaces than their prime spaces of mobilization, namely the stadium. By
reclaiming the street and the walls of the different cities – not only those surrounding
stadium grounds – the Ultras took possession of these areas and made them their own,
thus expanding the conception of contentious politics and the ways by which they are
implemented on the ground.
 
From stadium to street: the Ultras’ mobilization
processes
Being an Ultra is more than football. Being an Ultra means you respect the code and
live by it. F05B… F05D Being an Ultra is about loving football, your team and your people.
You know…we look out for each other.11
21 The first Ultras movement appeared in Italy in the late 1960s, established by a union of
workers who wanted to denounce the shortcomings of the commercialisation of football
(Louis 2008; Armstrong; Testa 2010). Although originally influenced by the British model
of hooliganism, manifested as a sort of extension of the working class (Roversi; Balestri
2000: 187), the Italian model was closer to the anti-system youth movements of the 1960s
and 1970s, engaged in demonstrations, thus encouraging the Ultras movements to adopt
the same modes of action and forms of organisation (Balestri; Podaliri 1998). 
22 The first Egyptian Ultras groups started forming in the early 2000s via the Internet and
through forums before emerging as distinctive organisations in 2007, based on the Italian
model (Beshir 2011). Other forms of organized support existed prior to the establishment
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of the Ultras. Until the end of the 1990s, Egyptian football fans were known as Tersos,
derived from the Italian word Terzo, meaning “Three”. In Egypt, Terso came to refer to
the fans from lower social classes who could only afford to buy third-class tickets to see
the games (El-Zatmah 2012: 801). 
23 Appearing as early as the 1920s, the Terso fans shaped Egyptian football with their chants
and songs, making football an integral part of Egyptian national culture (El-Zatmah 2012).
The Terso fan-base consisted of a rather homogenous social group with regards to age
and gender, and cultivated a non-violent culture of support, as opposed to their Latin
American and Northern European counterparts, whose hooligan fan culture was largely
rooted in violence, particularly during the 1970s and 1980s (El-Zatmah 2012).12 The Terso
phenomenon started to disappear at the beginning of the 1980s, mainly due to worsening
socio-economic conditions of the lower classes, making it challenging for the fans to buy
tickets.  The worsening economic conditions,  coupled with the rise  of  greater  gender
segregation measures limiting the presence and participation of women in the public
sphere (brought forth by the rising Islamisation of the culture),13 contributed to the third-
class ticket seats to be mostly dominated by young males who would later come to form
the Ultras (El-Zatmah 2012: 802). 
24 The changing structure of football fandom in Egypt at the end of the 1990s, beginning of
the 2000s, was a reflection of both a wider socio-economic and cultural change in the
country, characterised by the rise of neoliberal policies, growing unemployment rates,
and an amplification of  social  inequalities  (immiseration of  the middle  class,  and an
upsurge of people living on less than two dollars a day),14 as well as a change brought
forth by the development of the Internet and the development of social media channels
such as Facebook, and Twitter.15 
25 Different  pro-democracy  movements  started  to  emerge  and  formulate  demands
(Abdelrahman 2012). These new movements, and especially movements such as Kefaya,16
were the first movements to transcend ideological divides and overcome this “general
state of political apathy” (Hosseinoun 2015: 43). By breaking the taboo usually associated
with contentious practices, Kefaya opened up new possibilities for contentious collective
action in Egypt (El-Shorbagy 2007). 
26 In  this  context  of  socio-economic  unrest  and  burgeoning  contentious  action,17 the
Egyptian  youth  –  the  shabab –  found  itself  directly  affected  by  the  lack  of  job
opportunities related to their fields of specialisation and qualification, forcing them to
seek and accept low paid, precarious and temporary “odd jobs”. Accordingly, it does not
seem surprising that the Ultras groups started to appear at the same time as these activist
groups, the youth finding in football a way to express and channel their disillusionment
and frustration with their situations (El-Zatmah 2012).
27 The social  profile  of  the  Ultras  is  widely  representative  of  the  demographics  of  the
Egyptian youth. Aged between 15 and 35 years old, they sweep through all social classes
of  society,  though a  large  portion  of  their  members  belong  to  the  upper  classes  of
Egyptian society, unlike their European counterparts (Hourcade 2000; El-Zatmah 2012;
Lebrun 2013).18 What is more, many Ultras – regardless of social class – are well educated
and carry a University degree or are currently pursuing studies, as a result of the free
education system for public schools in Egypt, the private system being more expensive
(Cupito;  Langsten 2011).19 So the main issue for these young Egyptians resides in the
imposed set of goals to achieve and norms to respect according to their social status and
qualifications. They feel like they are expected to live up to society’s standards without
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being given the tools nor the means to properly respond (Abdelrahman 2012). In this
sense, certain sections of the youth find in their commitment to the Ultras groups an
opportunity to counter the denigration. The Ultras groups in this context, represent an
outlet for their frustrations, a way to escape the realities of their daily lives.
28 The Ultras groups’ organizational chart is said to work “horizontally” by its members, in
order to preserve the logic of sharing and equal participation of each member. However,
a hierarchy does exist, so as to guarantee a flowing and coordinated strategy. UA and
UWK differ slightly in certain ways, however their overall structure is very similar. The
Ultras groups organize around leaders, or kabos (their numbers vary according to the
group), which is the most prestigious position as they act as choreography coordinators
during  the  matches,  as  well  as  manage  the  daily  running  of  the  group  and  settle
important issues. They are helped and supported by the section leaders – also called qaïd
(commander)  or  raïs (president)  –  who  relay  and  apply  decisions  within  their  local
sections. Section leaders and kabos meet when important decisions regarding activities
and dakhalat need to be made. In some groups (such as UWK),  there is a distinction
between the sections from outside the capital (known as sections), and those from Cairo,
known as dawla (states). The rest of the members are known as “active Ultras”.20
29 The Ultras’ identity is deeply rooted in football and is revealed most frequently during
the games,  but is  not limited to the sporting arena.  Ultras Ahlawy and Ultras White
Knights were the first groups to appear in Egypt and became the two largest and most
visible organizations in the country (Dunmore 2007; Mazhar 2009). Their activities are
focused on the club and the support for their respective teams and are aimed at inspiring
a sense of belonging among the supporters, impressing spectators with the flare shows
and the chants, and intimidating rival teams’ supporters.
30 Football supporters, and Ultras in particular, may resort to violence in cases of “self-
defense”,  notably  when  they  are  being  hassled  by  the  police  at  the  end  of  football
matches due to their use of flares and “politically incorrect” slogans (Beshir 2012:36).
Police forces routinely arrest supporters the night before the game for “questioning”, to
ensure that they do not represent a threat to “national security” and release them the
day after, sometimes in bad shape (Beshir 2012; Lebrun 2013). Their use of violence is not
only limited to self-defense. Some of the more “hard-core” fans customarily organize
“street  fights”  with  rival  supporter  clubs  bringing their  activities  closer  to  those  of
traditional hooligans.21 
 
The stadium, prime space of the Ultras’ mobilization
31 Focusing on the Ultras groups as social actors who traditionally tend to “steer clear of the
political world”,22 enables the observation of new dynamics of interaction between these
different groups in authoritarian contexts, thus bringing the concept of activism to the
forefront of discussion. The Ultras of Cairo provides a good case study for the analysis of
the “the dynamics that occur outside formal groups” (Aarts; Cavatorta 2011: 3), understood as
social movements, trade-unions, organized movements such as the Muslim Brothers, etc.
32 A special emphasis is to be put on the role of space in the formation of collective identity,
particularly when studying groups such as the football supporters. Fernando Bosco (2001)
argues that “place-based collective rituals” serve to maintain social network cohesion both
spatially and symbolically.  Places that are collectively identified as meaningful to the
cause  become symbols  to  build  and maintain existing network connections  (see  also
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Leach; Haunss 2009; Creasap 2012). The concept of territory and public space is closely
related to the Ultras and their activities. As was noted earlier, Egypt’s authoritarian rule
and the overbearing presence of control mechanisms reduced public space considerably
through extensive surveillance techniques and physical intimidation and abuse (Ismail
2012). The stadium and its surroundings on the one hand, and the walls surrounding the
stadia and Tahrir square on the other, became virtual spaces of freedom and autonomy
for the Ultras groups where the frustrations of humiliation and abuse could be channelled
(figures 1 and 2). 
Figure 1. No SCAF (Supreme Council of the Armed Forces).
Source: Kingfut.
Figure 2. ACAB (All Cops Are Bastards).
Source: UA07.
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Figure 3. Zamalek stadium, Cairo, May 2012.
Figure 4. Anti-media (Ultras White Knights), Zamalek Stadium, 2012.
33 As stated above, the stadium, in contexts like Egypt, can be used as a space of freedom
and dissidence allowing the people to voice certain opinions and grievances. From the
outset of  their supporting activities,  the Ultras made use of  the stadium not only to
express their support for their team (figure 3), but also to express their disapproval of the
figures of authority (club managers, the media, the police, the Ministry of Interior), may
it  be by using tifos (displays and banners,  as well  as choreographies),  or by drawing
graffiti  on  the  walls  surrounding  the  stadium  (figure  4).  In  the  first  days  of  the
Revolution, the stadia and their walls were used to send messages of unity as well as to
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denounce the violence used against the protesters. After the events of Port Said however,
the stadium was off-limits to the public, including the Ultras, giving their mobilization a
new impetus.23
 
Port Said, a defining moment in the Ultras’ mobilization
34 On 1 February 2012, 74 Ahly fans were killed in what was presented as a “riot between
football fans gone wrong”.24 The Ultras interpret the Port Said clashes as a kind of vendetta
on  the  part  of  the  security  forces  for  t  the  Ultras’  participation  in  the  Revolution.
Following the events, massive protests erupted in Cairo and around the country, with
people blaming the security forces for the deadly violence. Ultras in Egypt have always
had a difficult and “dysfunctional” relationship with the security forces. Many of them, as
well as an abundant portion of the protesters, believe the Port Said clashes to be a way for
the  security  forces  –  and  by  extension,  the  government  –  to  take  revenge  for  the
supporters’ participation in the uprisings (Gibril 2015). 
35 More than just a “football riot”, Port Said represents a breaking point in two ways. First,
it reveals a change in the involvement of the Ultras in the large-scale mobilization. While
their participation was undeniable in the first days of the uprisings, it was limited to a
passive engagement. Their presence in Tahrir Square was specifically aimed at defending
the protesters against police brutality. It is essential to bear in mind that the Ultras were
not one of the leading forces of the movement, merely responding to a call from the
organizing social movements, namely Kefaya and the 6th of April Movement, as well as
the administrators of the “Kullena Khaled Said” Facebook page. After Port Said, their
involvement as a group became clearer, essentially because they had a common issue and
message to carry out to the regime: justice for the fallen of Port Said. What is more, in a
gesture of solidarity and support towards the Ultras groups, many “civilians”25 took part
in the demonstrations, some going as far as joining the Ultras groups as full members.26
36 Secondly, the forced shutting of the stadiums to the general public – including the Ultras
– after the deadly events, forced the supporter groups to find other spaces and ways to
express their grievances; spaces that most notably included the street (as regards the
demonstrations against the regime after the events), the walls surrounding the various
stadiums, the walls of the different major cities in Egypt, as well as through the use of
songs tackling the issue of martyrdom and the injustice of the events.
 
Constructing protest through image: The Ultras and
their graffiti
37 Street art, or the art of graffiti, has been considered by social scientists as an efficient tool
of expression, particularly in areas where political activism and resistance is difficult. For
instance, the act of writing on walls was quite common in East Germany, in Northern
Ireland and in the Palestinian territories (Rolston 1987; Peteet 1996; Crettiez 2014). In the
Palestinian  case,  most  notably,  the  analysis  focused  on  the  ability  of  street  art  to
strengthen communities, unravel power relations within specific socio-political contexts
such as the Intifada (Peteet 1996),  as a form of political discourse and as a means of
resistance (Bseiso 2017). More recent works on street art in Palestine have mainly focused
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on the ways in which graffiti is utilized to access a more international space and network
in order to promote a dialogue with a more international audience (Toenjes 2015). 
38 In the Egyptian case, there was a notable lack of academic work on street art prior to the
uprisings though some pieces could be found on the aesthetics and stylistic features of
Arabic graffiti and “street graphics” (Dawson 2003), as well as some rare articles on blogs
and, exceptionally, in newspapers. This gap implies that the study of street art only came
to fame in the aftermath of  the Egyptian Revolution,  becoming the main object  of  a
number of  graphic  books (Gröndahl  2012;  Zeitouna 2012;  Helmy 2013;  Euverte  2015),
essays and magazine articles, as well as documentaries (see for example, Marco Wilms’
“Art War” 2014). The increase of such research allowed for different levels of analysis
including the different art trends in post-Revolutionary Egypt (Carle; Huguet 2015; Abaza
2016), the representation of martyrs and the discussion of the concept of martyrdom in
the  creation  of  collective  memory  (Sharaf  2015).  One  of  the  most  recurring  themes
however, is the understanding of graffiti and street art as a tool of political struggle and
dissent (Khatib 2013). In the context of the Egyptian Revolution, graffiti – and its space –
included the dimension of resistance in addition to the act of transgressing the rules.
Some authors have suggested that  its  visibility somewhat extended the public  space,
creating a “subversive sphere” where people could express their opinions, grievances,
discontent, anger, distrust, and/or nostalgia (Abaza 2016; Fahmi 2009; Nicoaerea 2014). 
39 Before the uprisings, the Ultras were the prime utilizers of graffiti, using it to mark their
territory, declare their allegiance to their club, criticize their rivals, as well as oppose the
Ministry of Interior, the police and club owners.27 In the next sections, we will focus on
the Ultras’ use of street art with regard to two main themes that have become central in
their mobilization and identification processes: their rapport with figures of authority,
and the figure of the martyr.
 
The Ultras’ rapport to figures of authority
40 The police, or dakhlyyia,28 and security forces in Egypt are to be distinguished from the
army.  While  the  army  was  credited  by  the  population  for  restoring  stability  to  the
country after the ousting of Mubarak in the wake of the uprisings29 (Karawan 2011: 45),
the police’s role was that of the oppressor and the physical representative of the Ministry
of  Interior.  In Egypt,  the police act  not  only as  the organization in charge of  public
security but first and foremost as an agent of the government. In addition to ensuring
public and national security, the police’s power covers other areas, such as the market,
transport,  roads,  taxation  and  public  morality  (Ismail  2012).  The  Egyptian  police
apparatus is, by design, intrusive, abusive and violent. The organizational chart of Egypt’s
Ministry of Interior is quite revealing with regard to the extensive remit of the police’s
monitoring and surveillance as well as the degree of specialization and complexity of its
departments (Ismail 2012). 
41 This intrusiveness can be attributable to several  political  factors that have aided the
police in consolidating their power, notably the role it was assigned in repressing the
Islamist opposition, dating back to the 1950s and 1960s. Another important factor was the
state’s decision to withdraw from certain welfare provisions and its promotion of neo-
liberal economic policies, which led to the development of an informal labour market as
well as the privatization of social services (Ismail 2012). Both these factors resulted not
only in the heightening of security controls, but also, and more importantly, it reinforced
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the existing corrupt system. In addition to serving the interests of the ruling elite, the
security forces developed their own corrupt culture, instating a system of bribes and
placing  what  is  known  as  “plain-clothes”  policemen  –  civilians  hired  by  police  and
security forces to collect information – in neighbourhoods under the pretence of ensuring
stability and peace (Abdelrahman 2015). To do so without raising suspicion30, the police
usually position their undercover informants in local communities by providing them
with a vending kiosk or by appointing them to the carta system, shuttle buses and vans.
42 One key  component  of  the  Ultras’  identity  is  this  intrinsic  opposition  to  police  and
security forces.  This  relationship structures their  motives for mobilization as well  as
reinforces their sense of belonging to the Ultras as a group. The Ultras’ clashes with the
police are cultivated in a long history of violent encounters, of humiliations (the police
often use the expression “ya walad” meaning “you boy”, closely related to the reference to
“boy” used during the segregationist period in the United States) and harassment (Ismail
2012). The feeling of anger and humiliation is an important feature of the relationship
between the Ultras and the police, as it contributes to the development of a sense of
injustice,  which in turn encourages an upsurge of  violence against  police forces  and
shapes the supporters’ identity (“I am an Ultra, and as an Ultra, I am opposed to any kind
of figure of authority”) (Gibril 2015: 313):
When one of us is attacked, the whole group is attacked. We don’t use our fists
unless we have to. With the police, we have to be violent because they always attack
us […] we have to defend ourselves and our colours.  It’s  in our values:  “always
sacrifice for the group”. That’s what we do. What am I supposed to do?! Say “no I
can’t fight because I’m going to shock your grandmother?” It doesn’t work like that.
When the group needs you, you immediately react.31 
43 Different tools are used to express this opposition, outside of the clashes that take place
in and around stadium grounds on game day. Besides their use of graffiti, which will be
discussed below, the Ultras resort a lot to using slogans, chants and songs to express their
hatred and contempt for police and security forces, may it be through the proliferation of
slogans such as “ACAB [All Cops Are Bastards]” or through the extensive use of flares and
shamarikh which are normally prohibited in the stands. It is also quite common to find
song lyrics referencing the police, the regime and the security forces, accusing them of
high-jacking freedom and cultivating a climate of repression, as in the case of Ultras
White Knights’ song “Shams el Horreya [Sun of Freedom]”:
“Shams el Horreya” [Sun of Freedom] Ultras White Knights (Zamalek)32
Gozo’  fi  ‘aqleyyti  ma  fehemhoush  el  t
oghaah
A  part  of  my  thinking  [is]  not  understood  by  the
oppressors
Qalou shortah fi khedmet sha’ab konna e
hna el ‘abeed
They said “police at the service of the people” [but]
we were the slaves
Qatalouna  wa  katamou  si  soutna  belnar
welhadeed
They killed us and silenced us with fire and iron
Gahala  welqam’  hayat  hom  wa
khayalhom mareed
Ignorance and oppression is their life and they have
sick minds
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Eqtel  wa  sgen  eeh  el  gedeed  ebny
segounak ‘aleeha
Kill and imprison, what is new, build your prisons,
make them high
Figure 5. Ultras White Knights, “They have sick minds” Zamalek stadium, 2013.
Figure 6. Ahly stadium, 2013.
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44 In their graffiti, figures of authority – regularly represented by the police officer – are
often depicted in seemingly humiliating postures such as here in figure 5. The police
officer  is  represented  as  a  ballerina,  revealing  an  apparent  lack  of  masculinity
accompanied by the quote ‘They have sick minds’, referring to their weakness and deviant
ways. The idea here is not to open a debate on the issues of gender in Egypt, however it is
important to bear in mind that Egypt remains a very conservative society in which any
effeminate behaviour is strongly frowned upon and criticized. What is more, “being gay”
and  being  identified  as  “gay”  is  a  powerful  insult,  especially  with  regard  to  men’s
behaviours. Still, in this case, the portrayal of the police figures as “being gay” is to be
understood in opposition with the Ultras groups who describe themselves as the epitome
of  masculinity,  toughness  and  resistance  to  these  figures  of  authority.  By  using  the
cultural reference of “homosexuality” and “effeminacy”, they show their supremacy and
their lack of fear towards what is supposed to be the physical representation of the Law.
45 However,  a  particular  mural  painted by the Ultras  representing two cops kissing (in
reference to the Banksy stencil) created a few issues and was altered quite quickly. 
Figure 7. “Cops are Gays”: center of Cairo, 2013.
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Figure 8. “Homophobia is not revolutionary”, Cairo 2013.
46 The two policemen in figure 7 were painted at the same time as the “Never Forget” in
reference to Port Said. The message here, ‘Cops are Gays’, is another attempt to undermine
the  authorities  by  associating  them with  what  they  interpret  as  being  a  “weak  and
effeminate” figure, with deviant ways, hence utilizing, once more, the gender rhetoric to
mock and ridicule the figures of authority. This particular graffiti was quickly replaced by
the mural shown in figure 8, stating ‘Homophobia is not revolutionary’ thus hindering this
homophobic and gender biased repertoire. The replacement of this particular mural was
not the act of Ultra graffiti artists, the use of gender-biased tropes being an important
element  of  the  Ultras’  identification  and  oppositional  process  (“we,  the  virile  and
powerful against them, the effeminate and weak”).
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Figure 9. “We hear your fear”, Zamalek stadium, 2013.
Figure 10. “All Cops Are Bastards – The time of silence has ended”, Zamalek stadium, 2013.
47 Ultras also show their opposition to figures of authority by intimidating them either by
letting them know they are aware of their fear of Ultras as a group (figure 9),  or by
portraying them as smaller and weaker than them. Figure 10 is quite representative of
this idea that the Ultras – as a group – are by far stronger and braver than the police
forces. This idea is supported by the use of the acronym ‘ACAB’ (All Cops Are Bastards)
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and the quote that reads ‘the time of silence has ended’. It is also emphasized by the police
officer being held in a dominated posture and shedding a tear of fear at the sight of his
attacker (an Ultra).
48 For  a  great  majority  of  their  existence,  the  Ultras’  repertoire  regarding  graffiti  was
limited to the glorification of the club and team, with a special emphasis on provoking
and insulting the police forces. This was not only limited to the murals, it was also an
essential  part of their supporter paraphernalia (banners,  scarves,  chants,  slogans and
songs).
 
The Ultras and the concept of martyrdom
49 The Egyptian uprising  and its  aftermath were  characterized  by  a  number  of  violent
events such as the Battle of the Camel on 2 February 2011, the clashes of Mohammed
Mahmoud Street in November 2011, or the Port Said massacre of 2 February 2012. The
question that arises then is who becomes a martyr, and who is simply dead? Martyrdom is
defined as giving one’s life for a cause, a better state of affairs, and simultaneously it can
be about one’s fate in the afterlife. Yet, the “martyr label” is only assigned post factum
(Mittermaier 2015: 588). 
50 Katherine Verdery suggests that the true symbolic and political power of the dead lies
specifically  in the interpretive malleability  and ambiguity  of  their  meaning (Verdery
2004: 306), thus becoming a powerful tool of mobilization for the living. The images of
their wounds, bruises and dead bodies are crucial in the ritualization process of martyrs.
They act as a powerful reminder of the sacrifices that were made in the name of a greater
good as well as raise the question of what these young people died for (Armbrust 2013).
Martyrs  can  also  be  objects  of  admiration  or  even  role  models  and  heroes,  thus
contributing to the development of a revolutionary ideal. 
51 After  Port  Said,  the  issue  of  martyrdom  became  very  central  to  the  Ultras-related
practices,  most notably their slogans,  graffiti  and demands.  A wide variety of graffiti
emerged on the walls of the stadia around the country, but more significantly, the faces
of  the  different  martyrs  started  to  appear  on  the  walls  surrounding  Tahrir  and
Mohammed Mahmoud Street, mostly aided by some prominent graffiti artists such as
Ganzeer, Ammar Abu Bakr and Alaa Awad (Abaza 2016). 
52 A  whole  new  series  of  graffiti,  slogans  and  designs  started  to  integrate  the  Ultras
mobilization  registry  after  the  Port  Said  events.  Among  them,  the  notorious
"Brotherhood in Blood" which appeared on the walls of Cairo (and Egypt as a whole) soon
after the events, epitomizing the peace agreement that had been negotiated between the
two biggest rival clubs, al-Ahly and Zamalek. 
Figure 11. ”Brotherhood in blood”, AUC, April 2013.
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53 The  colours  used  here  are  a  reference  to  both  football  clubs,  Al-Ahly  and  Zamalek,
although some Ultras give them a special meaning: the red stands for the bloodshed, the
black refers to the colour of grief, and the white stands for both the unity of all Ultras
groups and the purity of the message.33 The concept of "brotherhood in blood" refers to
the unity between the members of the various Ultras groups, whether friend or foe, as
well as to the support given to the families and friends of the martyrs. One of the leaders
of the Ultras White Knights (Zamalek) explains that as an Ultra, “you are connected to all
Ultras of the world. When a group is attacked, it is the entire Ultra identity that is attacked ... no
matter which team you support.  In these moments,  we are all  linked to each other.  We fight
together”.34
Figure 12. “Shahid”, Ahly stadium.
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Figure 13. “Never Forget”,Ahly Stadium, 2013.
54 Another  important  set  of  imagery  to  make  its  way  into  the  mobilization  tools  and
processes of the Ultras was the “Never Forget” along with the number 74, referencing and
remembering the Port Said events and the number of victims. They are often portrayed
together, and sometimes, as shown in figure 13, one can find the names of the different
martyrs, as well as the signature emblem of the Ahlawy Ultras (as shown in figure 12). Not
only did they integrate the graffiti  registry, but also the tifos, banners and songs, all
essential elements of the Ultras mobilization paraphernalia. 
Figure 14. “Martyrs”, Mohammed Mahmoud, 2012.
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Figure 15. Al-Naaehaat (The mourning women), Mohammed Mahmoud, 2012.
55 Finally, and maybe in the most significant way, the concept of martyrdom was epitomized
by the faces of the Ultras – among others – painted on the walls of Mohammed Mahmoud,
also known unofficially as sharei’ uyuun al-huriyyah (the street of the eyes of freedom35)
(Abaza 2013).  These can be found in many different forms: in some case represented
abstractly as a winged angel figure, one of graffiti artist Ammar Abu Bakr’s trademarks.
They are sometimes accompanied by a quote such as Kaizer’s “The meaning of life is that
you give it [to life] a meaning” (Abaza 2013: 3). In other representations, the martyrs are
portrayed realistically, surrounded by wings, flowers and black ribbons. 
56 The “al-Ahly Ultras” murals are mostly multi-artist graffiti painted by Ultras members
and well-established graffiti artists such as Abu Bakr, Ganzeer, or Alaa Awad. They gather
a complex amount of works by several artists simultaneously, reflecting the continuous
evolution of the graffiti. In figure 14, in the upper-left corner is an image an Ahly Ultra
(recognizable by the “UA” on his red shirt). Underneath him, a partial fresco by Ultras
artist, “Khaled”. One can decipher the explosion of a firework (used by the supporters
during  football  matches)  pointed towards  a  military man,  represented as  a  demonic
figure with sharp nails and teeth, accentuating the dichotomy between “good and evil”.
Around the Ultras figure are portraits of the other martyrs, including those of Mohamed
Nasser Hector and Mahmoud Soliman, two civilians killed in the Port Said massacre. 
57 Figure 15,  is  Alaa Awad’s Al-Naaehaat,  or the “Mourning Women” of  ancient Egypt,  a
fresco depicting a funeral scene where these women are accompanying the sarcophagus
into  the  afterlife.  This  particular  scene  can be  found a  little  further  away from the
portraits  of  figure  8,  symbolizing  the  author’s  desire  to  commemorate  the  fallen.
According to Awad, the artist, the women on the upper part of the mural represent the
muses receiving the ascending souls of the martyrs. The black flowers represent Lotus
flowers and are a sign of great sorrow. Finally the tiger-like figure is a symbol of anger for
the 74 victims who died in Port Said (Abaza 2016).
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Conclusion
58 The objective of this paper was to examine the different spaces favoured by the Ultras,
namely the stadium and the walls, within the general framework of collective action. By
focusing  on  the  Ultras’  graffiti  in  particular,  we  aimed  at  understanding  their
mobilization processes within a given space, most notably by analysing their rapport with
figures  of  authority  as  well  as  the  ways  by  which  the  concept  of  martyrdom  was
integrated into their paraphernalia. Drawing on James Scott’s concept of infrapolitics and
Asef Bayat’s concept of politically charged acts by ordinary actors, this article further
aimed at highlighting the Ultras’ capacity to operationalize and use graffiti and street art
to express a series of grievances without associating themselves with the conventional
forms of political dissent such as social movements.
59 Throughout the paper, it was shown that Ultras groups cultivate a difficult relation to the
different figures of authority, most notably with the police with whom they share a long
history  of  violence  and  confrontation.  By  analysing  their  graffiti,  we  were  able  to
distinguish certain recurring themes and messages including those of weakness, insults
(the reference to “all cops are bastards”), stupidity (the portrayal of the police force as an
animal such as a pig or monkey, revealing their “intellectual limitations”),  and more
strikingly, a reference to effeminacy and homosexuality (the portrayal of police officers
as ballerinas or as being gay). This last topic is particularly interesting as it opens up a
whole new debate on the issue of gender in Egypt; an issue that would deserve further
study, not only with regard to the feminine figure in the revolutionary register, but more
importantly the use of feminine and/or homosexual imagery in the development of an
oppositional discourse, within Ultras groups and society as a whole.
60 It was further emphasized that the stadium, in this configuration, acted as the grounds
for the development of a space of resistance; a space that was subtracted from powerful
state control. While most of their actions within the stadium were aimed at supporting
their  teams,  this  space  contributed  to  building  and  strengthening  their  identity  by
allowing them to express themselves in ways that were not tolerated anywhere else. In
this  sense,  football  and  the  stadium  enabled  the  Ultras  to  free  themselves  from
institutional norms and oppose the general context of control. Indeed, by continuously
challenging and positioning themselves against state regulations, the Ultras were able to
efficiently turn the stadium and its surroundings into unique spaces allowing for the
(relatively) free expression of opinions and grievances.
61 After the events of Port Said, and the subsequent stadium ban, the Ultras turned to other
spaces and tools of mobilization, including the graffiti. And while their messages prior to
Port Said mainly targeted figures of authority in general, their messages after the events
mainly focused on condemning and denouncing the regime and the security forces for
the deaths. Much like the stadium, the arts (street art, music, dance and theatre) can be
understood as efficient means to bypass state repression and create alternative spaces of
expression and contention. This became all the more relevant at a time when the Ultras’
prime space  of  mobilization  was  off-limits  to  them.  What  is  more,  the centrality  of
martyrdom and the figure of the martyr in their art, reveals the centrality of emotions in
their repertoires of action, as well as establishes art as alternative ways of thinking and
performing protest and contention.
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62 Following the events of Port Said, both their street art and music were focused on the
idea  of  provocation and impact  with the  purpose  of  generating a  reaction from the
audience. By focusing on the register of martyrdom – as opposed to their more general
topics such as their club, their anti-corporate or their anti-media stances – we were able
to  associate  the  Ultras’  mobilisation  with  the  creation  of  sacralised  spaces  of
remembrance,  whether through image or sound.  Port  Said brought on a shift  in the
messages and themes used in the Ultras’ graffiti and street art (as well as the rest of their
paraphernalia – their slogans, chants, songs, and banners). This revealed a whole new
dimension of their identity, one that was closely related to death and the remembrance of
the martyrs. The 2012-2013 period witnessed a proliferation of winged portraits, poems
and messages demanding justice, not only emanating from the Ultras groups, but also
coming from established graffiti artists. The use of these martyr figures is quite revealing
of what Verdery calls the “powerful tool of mobilization for the living”. These Ahlawy
(supporters  of  al-Ahly  club)  martyrs  have been risen to  the  status  of  ‘heroes  of  the
Revolution’, thus giving the Ultras a positive image and contributing to the development
of an “idealization” of these groups in revolutionary collective memory.
63 One question still remains however: what makes the graffiti a distinct place of contention
and what happens once these murals are destroyed and erased? How do these spaces of
contention evolve and subsist to this day? These questions are difficult to answer as they
are being posed at a particular moment that does not give the retrospection allowed by
the passage of  time.  However,  certain elements  can be identified,  most  notably two.
Firstly, graffiti art, by its nature, avoids – at least partially – the overbearing control of
the  regime  that  has  obstructed  the  activities  of  many  social  movements  and
organizations. Its rapid growth and diversification, paired with the relative anonymity it
guarantees made it one of the most efficient ways to communicate in the first days of the
revolution,  not  to  mention its  capacity  to  document and relate  all  important  events
unfolding fast. In the aftermath of the uprisings, street art served as a reminder of past
events, as well as an efficient medium of remembrance; it served as an efficient way of
memorializing resistance.  Secondly,  the graffiti  of  the Egyptian Revolution benefitted
from large-scale publicisation and diffusion of  the works,  noticeably by virtue of  the
sharing and distributing on social media as well as through the publication of several
graphic  novels  dedicated to  the  documentation of  these  murals,  not  to  mention the
increased research conducted on the significance of graffiti in the studies of contentious
politics and resistance. Because of this attention and wide distribution of pictures, these
murals enjoy a certain kind of immortality and continuity that defies the boundaries set
by the Egyptian regime.
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NOTES
1. Mostly through the organisation of labour strikes, demonstrations and sit-ins, especially after
2004. See for example, Beinin; Vairel 2013).
2. The use of  these terms was very common among the protesters and the Ultras.  The 2011
uprisings represent that moment in time where they “took control over their future”.
3. “Ultras” should not be confused with “hooligans” as they are based on two very different
models. the British model – hooliganism – is characterised by a strong sense of group cohesion
with no durable commitment outside the stadium itself, and is particularly distinguished by a
culture  of  violence  and  confrontations  with  rival  groups  (Giulianotti  1999;  Dunning  2000;
Giulianotti; Armstrong 2002); the Italian model on the other hand – the Ultra phenomenon, is
characterised  by  a  strong  sense  of  community,  solid  organisational  ties,  and  elaborated
carnivalesque  displays  in  the  stadium  (Dal  Lago;  De  Biasi  1994).  What  is  more,  their  use  of
violence is seen as means rather than an end, as “a tool among others” (Roversi; Balestri 2000:
188). In other words, though both currents rely on violence, the Ultras tend to use it in a spirit of
“self-defense” rather than as one of the central tools of their mobilisation.
4. The Port Said events refer to the deaths of 74 al Ahly fans during a match opposing Cairo’s al
Ahly and Port Said’s al Masry. For more details on the unravelling of the events, see subsequent
section in this paper, “Port Said, a defining moment in the Ultras’ mobilization”.
5. The concept of “nonmovement” was coined by Asef Bayat to define the large number of citizen
groups that did not fall into the category of social movements, understood as the “organized,
sustained, self-conscious challenge to existing authorities” (Bayat 2013: 20). Nonmovements tend
to be action-driven rather than ideologically driven, as well as they do not have clear leader.
Even though the Ultras tend to be hierarchal and organized (the kabos being their “centres of
authority”), their activities are mainly driven by direct action rather than ideological influence,
as  well  as  they  have  no  desire  to  influence  the  political  decision  making  process.  For  more
information on this particular concept, see Bayat 2013.
6. Most of the Ultras’ use of the stadium before the 2011 uprisings was aimed at mocking the
opposing team as well as provoking the police and security forces present in the stadium. These
“teasing rituals”  made use of  flares,  slogans and chants ridiculing their  enemies  (police  and
opposing team). For further information on the role of the stadium as a space of socialisation, see
Bromberger et al. 2002; Hourcade 2000.
7. This law included certain articles that limited the opposition’s actions thus preventing the new
parties from conducting their activities until the approval was granted by the regime – a lengthy
process more often than not resulting in a rejection (Khatib 2013). The law was notably used for
the elections of October 2010 in which Mubarak’s party got 95 percent of the seats, alienating the
population.
8. Paraphrasing Asef Bayat (2003; 2009). 
9. Both categories were coined by Asef Bayat in his study of the “poor-people’s” movement in
Iran. These categories include the underprivileged classes of Iran. We have included the Ultras in
the  “marginalized”  category  mainly  because  the  Ultras  members  themselves  categorize
themselves as marginalized and part of this “disillusioned youth” directly affected by the lack of
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job  opportunities  and  seeking  refuge  in  various  channels  that  allow  them  to  express  their
frustrations. 
10. Before the Arab uprisings, the term “Arab street” often referred to “a reified and essentially
‘abnormal’ mind-set, as well as a strange place filled with angry people who, whether because
they hate us or just don't understand us, must shout imprecations against us […] Arab or other
Muslim actions are described almost exclusively in terms of ‘mobs, riots, revolts’” (see Satloff
2002; Bayat 2003). 
11. Extract from an interview with an Ahly Ultra, 1 June 2013.
12. For further information on the hooligan culture and the socio-economic conditions of its
emergence, see Giulianotti;  Bonney; Hepworth 1994. In this particular book, see most notably
Giulianotti 1994 in which he provides the reader with a detailed history of football hooliganism,
thus outlining the production of knowledge on fan violence. See also Giulianotti 2002; Giulianotti;
Armstrong 2002. 
13. For more information on the underlying causes of the rise of Islamic movements in the 1970s
and 1980s in Egypt, see Snow; Marshall 1984; Burgat; Dowell 1993; Ibrahim 1980; Kepel 1986.
14. For more information regarding the Egyptian context in the late 90s, early 2000s, Beinin;
Vairel 2013; Boutaleb 2011.
15. See Ghonim 2012; Castells 2009; Herrera 2012.
16. Kefaya (which translates to “Enough”) is and Egyptian movement that emerged in 2004 and
that was most notably opposed to Mubarak’s succession scheme (he wanted to nominate his son,
Gamal,  as his successor to the presidency),  as well  as Mubarak’s fikr jaded or “new thinking”
programme aimed at mass privatisation thus increasing the precarity of many Egyptian workers.
For more information regarding Kefaya and its struggles, see El-Mahdi 2009; Chalcraft 2013; El-
Shorbagy 2007.
17. Throughout the 2000s, one witnessed a recurrence of protests by different social movements
(such as Kefaya,  6th of  April  movement,  Tadamon-Solidarity…) struggling for social  rights and
justice for workers by organising sit-ins and strikes among others: see Beinin 2009. 
18. European Ultra and/or hooligan group members are usually associated with the lower and
poorer social classes of society. For more information regarding the socio-economic status of the
stadium demographics, see Giulianotti 2002; Bromberger; Hayot; Mariottini 1987. 
19. Regarding the public and private education system in Egypt, see Hyde 1978; Arum; Gamoran;
Shavit 2007; Cupito; Langsten 2011.
20. In this regard, see also Lebrun 2013.
21. For further information on hooliganism, consult Hourcade 2002; Bodin et al. 2005.
22. Expression  used  by  many  of  the  respondents.  The  Ultras  members  see  themselves  as
“apolitical actors” in the sense that they do not see themselves as being a part of what they call
the “political game”. Indeed they identify the word “political” with the idea of party politics. In
this sense, they do not understand or interpret their actions as being political,  but rather as
being a natural consequence of who they are as a group and what they stand for. 
23. Regarding the impact of the Ultras’ mobilization on the existing dynamics, as well as the
interaction with the different actors on the ground, see notably Gibril 2015. See also Lebrun 2013;
Rommel 2014.
24. This reference can be found in papers such as Egypt Independent, The Guardian, The Times, Al-
Jazeera.
25. Civilians as in “non-Ultras”.
26. There was a period between 2012 and 2014 where the Ultras saw their numbers explode due
to  a  high  volume of  new  affiliations,  the  word  “Ultra”  being  used  as  a  synonym  for
“revolutionary” thus attracting significant portions of the youth.
27. The Ultras were not the only groups to use graffiti,  this medium being regularly used by
different activist groups to call protest. 
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28. Dakhlyyia literally means “Interior” and refers to the Ministry of Interior. The use of this
term, refers to both the police as an individual and as an institution.
29. At  least  until  the  ousting  of  president  Morsi  in  2013.  Clashes  did  occur  between
demonstrators  and  the  army  during  the  pro-Morsi  rallies  and  demonstrations  against  the
military coup of June 2013.
30. Although this has never been an official practice, the use of these “agents” is knowledge to
the great majority of the population.
31. Interview with F., UKW, Cairo, April 2014.
32. Song by the Ultras of Zamalek club, 2012. Translated by the author.
33. Based on interviews conducted among al-Ahly and Zamalek supporters between 2013 and
2015. The use of colours could also refer to the colours of the Egyptian flag, further emphasizing
the solidary ties present among the population, however this remains a hypothetical assumption
as it has yet to be confirmed by the Ultras themselves.
34. Zamalek supporter, June 2013.
35. The name of sharei' uyuun al-huriyyah was given to Mohammed Mahmoud Street by a graffiti
artist  after  the  the  events  of  Mohammed  Mahmoud  street  in  November  2011,  as  an  act  of
remembrance for the people who lost their eyes to the snipers that were positioned at the top of
the buildings surrounding Tahrir. During the November 2011 clashes with the protesters, the
snipers aimed for the protesters’ eyes, hence the popularisation of the name to sharei' uyuun al-
huriyyah among the connoisseurs.
ABSTRACTS
The development of contentious collective action in Egypt has encouraged the emergence of new
spaces of protest, but also the development of new strategies of opposition. This article aims to
investigate the mobilization of the Cairo Ultras groups by examining their use of space, first
within  the  stadium  grounds,  and  particularly  through  their  use  of  graffiti  art.  Through  an
analysis  primarily  centred  on  their  graffiti,  we  wish  to  account  for  the  evolution  in  their
mobilization, as well as understand the development and transformation of their messages. The
present  study  is,  for  the  most  part,  based  on  a  thorough  analysis  of  graffiti  and  street  art
collected during a series of field trips conducted between 2012 and the beginning of 2015. The
majority of the data was gathered around Tahrir Square and Mohammed Mahmoud Street, as
well as around the Ahly and Zamalek stadia. Graffiti are of particular interest in the Egyptian
case, most notably because they allow for expression of a specific social and/or political reality
using precise graphic and discursive rules.
Le développement de l’action collective en Egypte a favorisé l’émergence de nouveaux espaces de
contestation mais aussi le développement de nouvelles stratégies d’opposition. Cet article a pour
but d’examiner la mobilisation des groupes Ultras au Caire en procédant à une analyse de leur
utilisation de l’espace, d’abord à l’intérieur des stades, et ensuite à travers leur utilisation de l’art
du graffiti. Par le biais d’une analyse centrée principalement sur leur graffiti, nous souhaitons
rendre compte de l’évolution de leur mobilisation, ainsi que comprendre le développement et la
transformation de leurs messages.  La présente étude se base pour l’essentiel  sur une analyse
approfondie de graffitis et de fresques collectés lors d’une série de terrains conduits entre 2012 et
le début de l’année 2015. La majorité des données ont été recueillies autour de la place Tahrir et
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de la  rue Mohammed Mahmoud ainsi  que dans les  rues entourant  les  stades d’al-Ahly et  de
Zamalek. Les graffitis sont particulièrement intéressants dans le cas égyptien, notamment parce
qu’ils sont capables d’exprimer une réalité sociale et / ou politique spécifique en utilisant des
règles graphiques et discursives précises.
INDEX
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